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Reuters and the British Government – Re-visited 
 
Peter Putnis 
 
The key finding of my examination of the relationship between Reuters and the British 
government during World War 1 (Putnis) stands unscathed. This is that the British 
government, through its Foreign Office, sought and obtained effective control over 
Reuters during the War and that it enjoyed this control from December 1916 till the War’s 
end. This control is evident in the ownership structure of Reuters (1916) Limited, the 
private company formed after the engineered sale and winding up of the public Reuters 
Telegram Co Ltd. The process was funded by a Government guaranteed loan of 550,000 
pounds from the Union Bank of Scotland. Its outcome was a new company structure in 
which Government nominees (bound by strict conditions to follow Foreign Office direction) 
held 76% of the voting power of the Company. These nominees purchased their shares 
with money supplied to them by the Government, drawing on Secret Service funds.1 
Furthermore, a special single share (‘share 999’) was created (owned by the government 
but held in trust by its nominees), the holder of which had, amongst other things, ‘a right to 
veto any resolution of the Board of Directors without assigning any reason for doing so.’2 
 
As Dr Silberstein-Loeb notes, it would be inappropriate to view the process that led to this 
outcome as a Foreign Office ‘takeover’ of Reuters (a term not used in my 2008 article). 
The outcome grew out of extended and, largely friendly, negotiations between Reuters’ 
Jones and Napier and the Foreign Office. The outcome (and the maintenance of the 
secrecy of the arrangement) could only have been achieved with the full support of Jones 
and Napier. Furthermore, it was in the interests of the Foreign Office for Reuters to be 
able to carry on ‘business as usual’ in its day-to-day operations. 
 
It is also reasonable to view the actions of Jones and Napier in seeking government 
support and compensation for war-time losses to Reuters’ traffic department as a 
‘business strategy’. My article, while focussing on issues of independence and control, 
outlined the financial problems of Reuters and (through providing detailed accounts of the 
various financial schemes put forward) recognised that the quid pro quo for ceding 
ultimate control to Government was immediate financial support for Reuters such as to 
secure its future. It was noted that the government only wanted control for the duration of 
the War. 
 
It is, however, difficult to credit Dr Silberstein-Loeb’s argument that the events of 
1915/1916 were part of a grand strategy by Jones to ‘improve Reuters’ position vis a vis 
the press’ and better position Reuters for ultimate sale to the British press. Certainly, one 
can see how the creation of a private company ultimately facilitated Jones’ sale of Reuters 
at great profit to himself. But Jones’ highly secret dealings with the government during the 
War also risked major reputational damage for Reuters as regards the independence of its 
news services. Moreover, the government had its own reasons for preferring a private 
company structure. This structure obviated the necessity for public reporting and made it 
‘easier to secure the true character of the proposed arrangement not becoming public.’3 
While the private company structure did ultimately allow Jones and Napier to take control 
of Reuters after the War, its more immediate result was to secure a government 
controlling interest in the company. 
 
Dr Silberstein-Loeb positions the Reuters/British Government arrangements within a 
larger framework of business re-structuring and assistance. This is a useful perspective 
which contributes to an understanding of the business history of Reuters. However, in 
doing so he unduly minimises the exceptional circumstances of the Reuters arrangement 
and the special (and crucial) role Reuters played as a vehicle for the government’s war-
time propaganda. He paints the Foreign Office as dancing to a tune composed by Jones 
and Napier and ascribes to the Foreign Office the largely reactive role of responding to 
Reuters’ initiatives rather than one of pursuing any policy agenda of its own. In this 
scenario the importance of the control issue is minimised and the arrangements finally 
agreed (including ‘share 999’) are viewed merely as a means of protecting the 
government’s financial interest in the company or as a kind of ‘shadow play’ of little policy 
significance. 
 
But such a scenario cannot explain the ‘share 999’ arrangements or the tenor of Foreign 
Under-Secretary’s (Lord Robert Cecil’s) detailed eight page letter to Jones and Napier 
dated 8 December 1916 (to which Napier and Jones had to formally agree), the purpose 
of which was to ‘put on record the manner in which it is intended that our controlling 
powers in the new Reuters company … are to be exercised’.4 Why would ‘share 999’ be 
deemed necessary by the Foreign Office if the issue of the control of Reuters was not a 
matter of major importance to it? 
 
While it is true that Jones sought every possible commercial advantage and was certainly 
not above exaggerating threats to Reuters (recognised by all as vital to Britain’s war effort) 
in order to interest the Foreign Office in his financial proposals, it is also the case that the 
Foreign Office forcefully pursued its own policy agenda. 
 
Jones was careful to take this agenda into account when framing his proposals. In one of 
his proposals, which sought a loan of 50,000 pounds from the government, and which he 
thought ‘quite defensible, from a Government point of view, as an ordinary business 
arrangement’ given that ‘the sum of money involved would be comparatively small’, Jones 
was at pains to point out that, ‘At the same time, whatever wish the Government might 
have, in the national interests, to prevent the Telegram Company from falling into 
undesirable hands, would be completely fulfilled.’5 
 
While it is true that the Foreign Office’s stance on Reuters evolved as the War progressed 
and as the importance of Reuters’ operations to the government grew (and, at least in this 
sense, policy development was ‘ad hoc’), one constant was the conviction that any 
financial deal with Reuters could only proceed if it also worked as a vehicle for the Foreign 
Office to gain ‘policy control’ over Reuters and if the role of the government could be kept 
secret. Contrary to Dr Silberstein-Loeb’s assessment, the government played a leading 
role in developing proposals to this end, particularly after the decision by the Foreign 
Office in August 1916 to re-open negotiations with Reuters. John Buchan’s eight page 
‘Memorandum on the Position of Reuters’ of 21 September 1916 spells out a set of 
‘Government desires’ regarding Reuters, including a Government nominee on the Board 
who would ‘have the power of absolute veto’ on questions of public policy. He then sets 
out in detail how a ‘Government proposal’ to achieve this might be developed.6 While 
Buchan consulted Jones in the preparation of his document, it is clear that his prime 
purpose was to find a way of achieving the government’s ‘desires’ or policy purposes. 
 
Dr Silberstein-Loeb makes much of his conclusion that Jones precipitated discussion with 
the Foreign Office (rather than the other way round), that ‘Jones and Napier submitted on 
their own account a proposition’ to ‘purchase Reuters with government backing’ and that 
hence it was ‘Reuters, and not government’ that ‘instigated the leveraged buyout in 1915.’ 
While it is the case that it was Napier and Jones who first proposed a leveraged buyout, 
my own reading of the available documentation suggests that the Foreign Office also very 
actively pursued its agenda, constrained though its actions were by the need for secrecy. 
A brief review of the initial phase of the negotiations is instructive in this regard. 
 
The question of whether Reuters or the Foreign Office initiated the meetings of early 
September 1915 remains obscure. In late August and early September, the government 
intercepted telegrams suggesting a possible unfriendly takeover of Reuters (Putnis 144). It 
is likely that these prompted the meeting between Robert Cecil and Napier which took 
place on the 6 September. We do not know what occurred at that meeting. However, the 
available evidence suggests that some kind of potentially controversial proposition was 
made at that meeting by Cecil. In a note to Cecil of the same date Napier wrote, ‘I have 
been thinking over what you said today and have decided not to mention the matter to any 
of my colleagues until I hear from you again.’ He went on to ask Cecil not to communicate 
with anyone in Napier’s office regarding this matter.7  
 
Jones comes into the picture very soon after, writing to Robert C. Witt (a government legal 
adviser) on 9 September that, ‘I should like to deliver to you in person a letter of 
introduction from Mr Mark Napier who authorises me to discuss with you the subject which 
you and he have been confidentially going into.’8 However, events in the Foreign Office 
were moving very quickly and Jones was playing catch-up. On 10 September Cecil sought 
legal advice on the question of whether a binding agreement could be enforced on a 
company giving another party [in this case the government] the right to appoint ‘X’ as 
Managing Director in return for ‘guaranteeing or paying a large sum to the Company over 
a fixed period’.9 On 11 September he wrote to Witt instructing him to ‘get a provisional 
agreement from Napier in the form most likely to carry out our wishes.’10 This initial 
proposal, which gave the government control over the appointment and conduct of any 
future Reuters’ Managing Director in return for a payment to Reuters of 20,000 pounds 
per year, was almost certainly a Foreign Office initiative. 
 
However, Napier and Jones moved quickly in response to this situation immediately 
proposing an alternative plan which involved a government-funded leveraged buy-out of 
the existing company and the creation of a new company which would issue shares ‘to be 
subscribed for and held by nominees of the Government.’11 Witt advised Cecil that the 
effect of this plan was that ‘the Government become owners of so much of the business 
as is acquired by the new Company’ but that the plan seemed ‘unnecessarily elaborate 
and far reaching considering that control is only desired during the period of the war.’12 
Clearly, in proposing a leveraged buy-out, Napier and Jones were (as Dr Silberstein-Loeb 
usefully highlights) pursuing their own business interests, while at the same time 
accommodating the government’s desire for control. However, Witt had reservations, 
expressing concern at Jones’ suggestion that ‘the shares to be subscribed in the new 
Company should be five only, and should be subscribed for by the four present Directors 
and a Nominee of the Government.’ Witt was clearly unhappy with the self-interested 
nature of the proposal, a likely factor in its rejection by the government (and the temporary 
discontinuance of negotiations) on 22 October, 1915.13 
 
Jones came back in early 1916 with alternative proposals for financial assistance not 
involving a leveraged buy-out but these were rejected as they could not deliver the degree 
of control the government sought. According to Witt these proposals did not satisfactorily 
address the ‘essential control question’ in that there was nothing in them ‘to prevent some 
outside person buying sufficient shares to give him control.’14 When negotiations resumed 
later that year the government’s legal adviser (in this instance Alexander Lawrence) 
indicated that in order for any government nominee to have a ‘permanent effective veto’ 
he required ‘a majority voting power.’ He suggested that the best way of achieving this 
was to buy out the existing Company and allot the necessary shares ‘in a new company 
direct to the Government nominee on its formation.’15 
 
All this is to say, that there was a great deal of toing and froing in the negotiations 
between Reuters and the government. The final leveraged buy-out plan was jointly 
developed in such a way as to achieve the government’s objectives. It also suited Napier 
and Jones. In the December 1917 agreement both of the immediate parties were winners. 
The losers were Reuters’ standing as an independent news agency and the cause of 
objective journalism. 
 
In my 2008 paper I outlined the historiography of the Reuters/government relationship, 
concluding with the remark that, ‘Up to this point … the exact nature of the relationship 
between Reuters and the British government during World War 1 and the extent of 
government control over Reuters have not been documented’. I went on to say that my 
paper ‘re-examines the relationship between Reuters and the British government’ (142). 
This is not quite the same as saying (in Dr Silberstein-Loeb’s words) that I sought to 
‘explain the “exact nature” of the relationship between Reuters and the government.’ Still, 
the point is taken. It is important to acknowledge that surviving records can never tell us 
the complete story. The records in this case appear remarkably fully preserved in the 
British National Archives. But even so, there are plenty of imponderables and certainly the 
surviving texts are capable of various interpretations particularly when the issue turns to 
human motivation.  
 
 
Notes 
 
                                               
1
 Foreign Office to Alexander Lawrence, 5 September 1918. TS 27/90 National Archives, UK (NA). 
2
 Endorsement on Share Certificate No 999. TS 27/90 NA. 
3
 Note by R.C. Witt (the government’s internal legal adviser) on Roderick Jones’ memorandum on 
interview at Foreign Office. TS 27/79A NA.  
4
 Robert Cecil to Napier and Jones, 8 December 1916. TS 27/90. NA. 
5
 Memorandum on Separation of Reuter’s Bank From Reuter’s Telegram Company, Ltd., 1 
February 1916. NA, TS 27/79A. As noted, Jones’ comments were made in relation to his proposal 
for a 50,000 pound loan not, as indicated by Dr Silberstein-Loeb, in relation to the later proposal for 
a government surety against a 550,000 pound loan. 
6
 Memorandum on the Position of Reuters Agency. TS 27/79a NA. 
7
 Napier to Cecil, 6 September 1915. TS 27/79A NA. 
8
 Jones to Witt, 9 September 1915. TS 27/79A NA. 
9
 Cecil to Witt, 10 September 1915. TS 27/79A NA. 
10
 Cecil to Witt, 11 September 1915. TS 27/79A NA. 
11
 New proposal of R.T. Company. TS 27/79A NA. 
12
 Witt to Cecil, 15 September, 1915. TS 27/79A NA. 
13
 Foreign Office to Witt, 22 October. 1915. TS 27/79A NA. 
14
 Witt to Montgomery, 3 March 1916. TS 27/79A NA. 
15
 Lawrence to Montgomery, 2 October 1916. TS 27/79A NA. 
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